GM: What volume of enquiries did you get about the sale of the club?

MB: Lewis and I continued to get enquires about the Club which we would 'warm up' with different scenarios - many enquires resulted in my having late night conversations and producing new financial projections in an evening or a weekend. If these went well, they were referred up to Ninth Floor and did not progress.

GM: The fans were hinting for a change at the top, what was the view in the Board Room?

MB: I prepared a budget for the upcoming season and presented it to McClure, making it clear at the time that I could not see the budgeted crowds of 5,000 being delivered under the current team manager and that a change was required. McClure took this away for consideration, but a few days later came back and made it clear that this was a cost which would have to be borne by a new owner.

GM: What in your opinion was the main stumbling block in finding a buyer for the club?

MB: By July 2001 Ninth Floor were quietly getting desperate. They were not succeeding in selling the Club given the scale of the projected losses - entirely down to the level of contracts they had built in to the Club over the preceding years.

GM: Was McClure's position with 9th Floor becoming untenable over this?

MB: The Stock Exchange announcement of the Ninth Floor results had been fixed for July 17th. Once fixed, any change in the date causes concern amongst investors - there is an assumption that the company is in trouble if the date is missed. I believe, though I have no evidence, that the Ninth Floor auditors made it clear that they could not sign off the accounts without either a sale of the Football Club or the injection of new funds in to Ninth Floor. Put simply, auditors have to be satisfied that the company will continue in business for another year before they will approve accounts: the projected cash outflows of the Club would bring the Ninth Floor down within the year.

Consequently a deal was done with Lewis to pass him the shares for £1 and get Ninth Floor out of the hole they were in.

GM: Non-financial people like myself are confused by the arrangements of the sale. Can you explain it in layman's terms?

MB: The sale agreement to Lewis specifically set out the amount of the inter-company balance (£801,000) and that it was repayable on Ninth Floor's demand. This is relevant to the administration petition later. Arrangements were also agreed for deferring the loan and making it repayable only out of the proceeds of an eventual sale of the Vetch or from Southampton for Jones and Crowell.

However, these arrangements could not be put in place for legal reasons - Lewis would effectively be giving Ninth Floor some of the Club's assets in return for buying the shares, which is illegal (it reduces assets available for creditors) unless it can be shown that the Club could trade for a year. This could not be shown until new funds were injected by a new owner.

GM: So 9th Floor were off the hook (albeit poorer) and the club had funds to run normally [sic] for a few months?

MB: Yes, though I was very, very aware that the Club was going to hit a brick wall in October. The October wages could not be paid without new funds from transfers or investment. It was an anxious time: I had not had any holiday since October the previous year because of sale negotiations and a feeling that Lewis could not be relied upon not to do anything daft, and suddenly here he was owning the Club!

GM: How rosy were the prospects of a sale?

MB: By late July we had four runners in the frame to buy the Club. These were: a steel magnate, a reality TV company (which would have turned the club in to a weekly world-wide soap opera!), a South African based in New York (Brian Katzen) and an Australian who made a couple of phone calls to Lewis called Tony Petty.

GM: What was going on with the playing staff at this time?

MB: Time moved on. Lewis signed John Williams and Nicholas Mazzina on generous contracts (and largely without consultation) and Mamady Sidibe on very sensible money. One club came in for Smudger but he was unfit - a sale would have made a major difference to the whole cash flow and season.

GM: What became of the interested take-over parties?

MB: During late August the steel magnate decided that he was too busy to get involved and by mid September it was clear that the reality TV company was not going to deliver funds in the required time-scale, if at all. Discussions with Brian were progressing well - he was very numerate and articulate and approachable - but slowly. The Board met and decided what criteria it needed from a buyer, particularly in terms of proven financial resources.

GM: So what was your assessment of Lewis's performance as MD?

MB: Lewis was finding ownership and fronting the Club very stressful, in fact he was completely stressed out, occupying the MD's chair but largely inert and incapable of taking even minor decisions on a rational and consistent basis. Anyone who has been there will understand the causes and symptoms.

GM: The team's results were beginning to nose-dive along with attendances. What was the view from upstairs of all this?

MB: Performances on the pitch were poor. I believed that the players had lost all respect for the manager and it showed on the pitch. The Manager appeared to have run out of ideas: every team we played knew how we were going to play and beating us was getting easier.

GM: Did the Board have a plan to arrest this?

MB: Mel Nurse and I eventually persuaded Lewis and the Professor that Hollins had to go. There was a complete lack of feel-good factor in the Club which was spreading to the fans and the City. Hollins was so grossly overpaid that, even allowing him a sensible payoff, we would break even on the change by the end of the season if we appointed someone else. We also knew that, because of League rules, if the Club had to go in to Administration at some future date then the Club would be better off with Hollins gone than with him and his contract still in place: once he had gone there was room to negotiate. (The Club has just used the same logic in a much more despicable way with Addison and Nicholas).

GM: What names were considered as a replacement?

MB: Lewis and I both wanted to talk to Colin Addison about taking over, and Mel, Lewis and I went to meet him one afternoon at the Vale of Glamorgan Hotel. And so the change was made. The idea to bring in Peter Nicholas as his assistant was Colin's, and one with which we were all delighted.

GM: Did the change of manager significantly aid the quest for investors?

MB: Not particularly one way or the other, although in general terms it lowered the projected losses. Come late September, I was geeing Brian Katzen up to bring it to a conclusion. He agreed to come to the game at Scunthorpe on 18th September. The hand of fate, in the form of the World Trade Center bombings, took place and he could not come. Petty suddenly announced that he was going to come over and look at the Club.

GM: You must have had reservations about Petty – how involved were you?

I had had no contact with Petty at that point, and so had not prejudged him. We warned Katzen that this Australian (who Lewis always claimed never to have met before, though looking back on it afterwards, he was the only one of the contenders I never, ever spoke to, which seems very odd if there was no relationship between the two) was likely to make an offer for the Club. Bear in mind that all we wanted was £1 and the resources to take it forward.

GM: There was a posting on the Internet that Petty had met with Lewis in a local chinese restaurant to agree the sale. Was there any truth in this?

MB: As I remember it now, Petty came over on September 25th and we played Shrewsbury Town at the Vetch that night. Afterwards, Lewis, Petty, Shuttleworth, Alan Wix from Ninth Floor and myself all went for a Chinese afterwards. Later on a large party of staff and fans came in, and Mark the fan on crutches had a long emotional conversation with Petty about how much the Club meant to him. At this point I realised, like a bolt of lightning, that Petty was a wrong 'un.

GM: What drew you to make that conclusion so quickly?

MB: His reactions to Mark showed that he really didn't give a sh*t, and I had a flashback to an experience in another business years ago where a plausible 'geezer' came in, made an emotional speech about how much he hated the common man being screwed by big organisations, and then became MD and screwed us all. (The difference between him and Petty was that the other guy could manage a business). This was the evening Alan Wix referred to much later when he said that Petty ignored him, once he felt that the Ninth Floor debt would not be called in.

GM: So did the deal go through that night?

MB: On the Wednesday, Lewis spoke to BK and said that Petty was here and likely to offer. BK asked for twenty-four hours to formulate something (this was going to be more like thirty-six because of the time difference). There was a pretty clear indication that an offer was coming, and we had done our research on BK and it was clear that he was far from penniless. Petty also knew of BKs existence.

GM: How much influence did you feel you, and the other Board members, had at this point?

MB: We felt very positive. We were very comfortable that BK was going to produce an offer, backed by cash, but also had Petty on the scene who might not be the most likeable guy but could perhaps produce a better one for the Club.

GM: So how and when did the actual transaction happen?

On Thursday 27th Petty and Lewis went to lunch. I was quite specifically not invited. About 3pm they returned, called me in about 4pm. Lewis left and Petty told me that he had bought the shares for £1, Lewis had resigned and he could not afford me and wanted me to resign immediately as well.

GM: Assuming you didn't see this coming, what was your reaction?

MB: To say that I was gobsmacked was an understatement. Throughout the sale process I had always known that Lewis would do what he thought best for Lewis, not the Club. This was why I got the Board to agree a set of criteria to judge potential buyers against. But to sell to a man with no proven worth, without consultation with the Board, when there was a better offer almost on the table was unbelievable, and which I can never forgive him for.

GM: Your relationship with Lewis was obviously strained. How did you deal with the hand-over?

MB: On a personal level my relationship with Lewis was fine, and though I regarded him as being well out of his depth I tried not to let it show - this would not have been good for our relationship or presenting a good front to the world on behalf of the Club. Anyway, shortly afterwards, the same day, Lewis confirmed to me that he had sold the shares and resigned, though neither he nor Petty would give me any paperwork at that time (I was company Secretary, supposed to register share transfers, as well as being a Director).

GM: You must have been more suspicious than Inspector Morse at this stage?

MB: Clearly something fishy was happening: people like Lewis do not just give up nice fat contracts for nothing. Now, of course, we know that Petty had agreed to at least give him a payoff, although I cannot see that the letter to Lewis is valid. Petty may have just bought the shares, but
(a) the transfer had not been registered, so he was not yet the owner in the company's eyes,
(b) he was not a director and so could not bind the company
(c) the payoff was never ratified by a subsequent Board Meeting and
(d) it was deliberately kept secret from the other directors at the time.

GM: You were clearly in a very difficult position over this?

MB: I was under considerable pressure at this point! I had duties as a company director, and without any evidence of new funds it was insolvent, I wanted to ensure the club's survival and wasn't convinced that Petty knew what he was doing, and I had moral responsibilities to Mel and the Prof..

Fortunately, experience is always useful and I have been in awkward situations when buying and selling companies before, but his was probably the worst because the whole business was conducted in the public eye and in the press.

GM: So what was your plan?

MB: My first step was to agree with Petty that, as he knew nothing about the Club and 'Lewis had resigned and was going' he would give me a month's trial and then we would talk about my future and what I was worth to the Club. He could hardly refuse this, although in retrospect he clearly did not intend me to last that long.

The Professor immediately resigned: pressure makes Parkinsons disease much worse and he became President. Mel and the Prof both made me promise not to resign under any circumstances: giant rats were already being smelt, although there was nothing substantive at that time.

The internet boys were also starting to create about Petty's past.

GM: Did Petty appear serious about 'making a go' of the club?

MB: Petty decided to rent a flat: for three months only. Clearly he did not intend to be around long.

Within a couple of days Petty started talking openly about the need to do a 'CVA' which was something I was not familiar with then. He also wanted to make the most expensive players redundant and fill their places with 'good Australians'.

GM: Where did Petty's backers fit in all this?

MB: Lawrence Oudendyk and Gary Wilkins arrived from the Brisbane Lions to view the Club: decent guys who talked a lot of sense and knew relatively little about Petty. They had been anticipating an investment of a total £150,000 or so: far too small in the current position.

GM: So despite the inadequate figure, their motives were genuine?

MB: Their rationale for doing the deal made a lot of sense. They felt that owning a club playing in the football league would improve the standing of the Brisbane Lions immeasurably back home, and their Club would recruit far better players if the incomers knew that success would translate in to a chance in the UK league.

They went home suggesting that they were comfortable to proceed once the cost base (ie player salaries in the main) had been sorted out.

GM: How much are you willing to tell about "Black Wednesday?"

MB: I do not think that it serves any useful purpose to go in to the events of October in too much detail; it was an awful time for all concerned. Petty was not concerned about taking on the PFA in the slightest: as far as he could see if the union did not like his actions he would find overseas players to play for the Club instead. He had not bargained for the Football League lining up shoulder to shoulder with the PFA, and that ultimately blew him out. His actions were made possible by his complete lack of concern whether the Club succeeded or failed: he had staked a £1 and this was purely a financial transaction to him.

GM: Do you think Petty was surprised at the depth of feeling his actions created?

MB: The reaction was far worse than predictable: Petty's confrontational style, dress sense, lack of respect for others and take-it-or-leave-it-but-what-else-am-I-supposed-to-do attitude made what was always going to be a public relations nightmare with the best presentation ten times worse. As he had only just bought the Club, people realised that this must have been in his mind all along, and hated him for it.

GM: How did he cope with this reaction?

MB: Petty went back to Australia: Shuttleworth was left in charge. He tried to persuade me to resign several times before finally sacking me on 23rd October, ostensibly for suggesting that Petty would never recover the faith of the local population and he should be looking to sell out (he had already been offered £50,000 for the shares by then). The reality was their need to get sole management control of the Club and its assets.

GM: Was there a genuine attempt at this stage to bring in new investment?

MB: I had continued to talk to Brian Katzen throughout this period; it was obvious that the Club would come back on the market shortly, even though this might mean pulling it out of liquidation. Very early on I had given Brian's number to Petty - as Petty was looking for finance, this was perfectly natural before Petty showed his full colours. However, Petty never called him, which added further suspicion as to his motives.

GM: How did you eventually come to be involved in the Consortium?

MB: I forget how Mel and I got together: although sacked, I felt that I could not run away, and Mel was still a Director. One day I had come to his hotel to talk, and he told me that he was talking to Alan Wix about buying the Ninth Floor debt. Then and there we set up a meeting with Gary Stones of Stones and Co and went round to see him a few minutes later: the ball rolled from there. (Gary, a long term fan, had already carried out some pretty major research on Petty entirely off his own back!).